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Abstract 
Five years ago, on December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian male, Mohamed Bouazizi, set fire to him-
self in frustration and anger. The frustrations and the anger were linked to his personal situation, 
having a higher education but no adequate job which was then linked to the overall socio-political 
situation in Tunisia. Tunisia, like most other Arab countries, was characterised by political repres-
sion and bleak economic prospects for the vast majority of the population. Nevertheless, Bouazizi 
suicide ignited popular protest movements in Tunisia and inspired uprisings in other Arab coun-
tries. One of the countries was Egypt where only 18 days of peaceful protests in Midan Tahrir in 
Cairo, resulted in the removal of the yearlong dictator President Hosni Mubarak. 
The project raises the question ‘why and how did the uprisings in Egypt’s Midan Tahrir take the 
form they did?’ 
 It is argued that the protests were initiated and continued to be promoted by the information 
spread via the digital media. However, the project maintains that the surprisingly big followings 
during the 18 days of protest can only be understood on the background of massive frustration and 
discontent in the Egyptian population because of widespread political repression, combined with 
increasing poverty and bleak economic prospects for the population in general. The project argues 
that the protest movement of Midan Tahrir most adequately can be described as a non-movement 
characterized by so-called connective action making street politics. This type of action may be de-
scribed as post-modern and not least weak in the long run because the participants only have one 
goal in common. 
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Clarification of terms 
Digital media Referring to digitized content that can be trans-
mitted over the internet. It refers to media such 
as text messaging, e-mail, blogs, social media 
sites etc. 
Social media Referring to websites and other online means of 
communication that are used by large groups of 
people to share information and to develop so-
cial and professional contacts, for example Fa-
cebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn etc.  
Traditional media So called ‘old-media’. Referring to media such 
as newspapers, television, radio, broadcast and 
the like.  
Mass media Referring to means of communication that can 
reach large numbers of people. 
Midan Tahrir Square in Cairo, the capital of Egypt. Meaning 
Liberation Square. Also referred to as Tahrir 
Square in the project. 
The Arab countries When mentioning to the Arab countries, the 
project refers the countries that participated in 
the Arab Spring. 
Coptic Christians A form of Christianity that is mainly to be 
found in North Africa and the Middle East. Es-
pecially in Egypt. 
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Introduction 
The Arab countries had for decades been characterised by dictatorships, suppression and massive 
breaches on basic human rights (Lynch 2011, p. 304; Springborg 2011, p. 427). The lack of political 
participation and even the simplest political rights for its citizens makes it reasonable to claim that 
the Arab world had been in a process of political decay for many years before the Arab Spring 
started in December 2010. It can be argued that what later became known as the Arab spring started 
when a young Tunisian man, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire on December 17, 2010. He did 
so as a result of his own personal issues with the government and a general frustration with the situ-
ation in the country. It was a frustration over the lack of prospects for a positive future, due to a 
widespread and high unemployment rate among young people including the well-educated youth. 
The incident led to protests which in the first round meant confrontations with the police. Soon, it 
became clear that there was a great amount of frustration and a general discontent with the govern-
ment among large segments of the Tunisian society. It led to several protest demonstrations not 
least in the capital Tunis. The uprisings became so massive that the president and his close allies in 
and around the government chose to flee Tunisia (Lynch 2011, p. 301). 
Soon after the fall of the dictatorship in Tunisia, mass protests began to emerge in Egypt, the most 
populous and most influential Arab country. The world, and not least the Egyptian government, 
were caught by surprise when on January 25, 2011, protesters started to gather in Midan Tahrir (in 
English; Liberation Square) in the middle of the Egyptian capital Cairo (Swanson 2014, p. 2). The 
protesters assembled in the square with the aim to force the dictator, President Hosni Mubarak to 
resign and also with another aim, namely to force the government to lift the emergency laws which 
had been in place for more than 30 years (ibid, p. 2).  
The Egyptian government reacted by using a combination of tactics. On the one hand, it applied the 
usual means of repression and on the other hand, it allowed the protesters to assemble in the square 
and also accepted that people camped in the square for weeks. The government’s security forces 
used teargas, water cannons and sound bombs against the protesters. The people generally respond-
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ed with a minimum of force, though some demonstrators threw stones at the police (Swanson 2014, 
p. 3). At one point, the police called a large group of loyalists to ride their camels into Midan Tahrir 
with the clear intent to intimidate and scare the demonstrators. The incident became known as the 
‘battle for Tahrir’ (ibid, p. 3). 
The demonstrators declared they would camp in the square until president Mubarak agreed to re-
sign. In the square there was a special and cheerful atmosphere almost like one of a festival or car-
nival with songs, performances, campfires and debates. Everyone had a place and everyone was 
equal. People treated one another with respect and like family and friends, sharing resources such as 
food, drinks and blankets (Shokr 2011, p. 1; Swanson 2014, p. 3). The regime tried to split the de-
monstrators by issuing a promise that president Mubarak would not seek a new term of office. 
However, the people in the streets and squares of Cairo did not believe the declaration from the 
president’s office and they continued their activities while shouting “irhal” meaning “leave” (Swan-
son 2014, p. 3). Nevertheless, in the early hours of February 11 rumours were confirmed that Mu-
barak had left the presidential palace and thereby left Cairo. Soon the streets of Cairo and other cit-
ies in Egypt were filled with millions of euphoric and relieved people (ibid, pp. 3-4). 
The resignation of President Mubarak and the flight of President Ben Ali in Tunisia were not only 
surprising, it is still highly puzzling what happened in Tunisia in the days of December, 2010 and 
even more so, how 18 days of peaceful demonstrations in Cairo was able to topple one of the most 
powerful presidents in the Arab world. The flight of Hosni Mubarak after only 18 days of protest 
from January 25 till February 11 apparently added yet another victory to the Arab spring.  
The sudden and unexpected protests in Tunisia led a lot of people to ask, what was the background 
to the protests and not least what was the explanation for the fast spread of the cry to protest? Soon 
it became common knowledge that the encouragement to rise in protest against the dictator in Tuni-
sia came via the digital media (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 36). The mass media in the country 
was government controlled and therefore the internet, Facebook, Twitter and SMS messaging be-
came the way to spread the word of protest fast and to literally every adult citizen of Tunisia (ibid, 
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p. 36). The same type of explanation was launched to explain the Egyptian change of power. Many 
observers tended to repeat the explanation that the digital media at least to a large extent created and 
maintained the uprisings in Cairo and in other Egyptian cities (Howard and Hussain 2011).  
If the digital media had such an impact on the course of events in Tunisia and Egypt, then Arab 
politics might be changing in fundamental ways. It seemed challenging and also puzzling that the 
dynamics of politics in the Arab world might be changing right under our noses. Therefore, the pro-
ject started out with the aim to look into how the digital media worked and how they were used dur-
ing the 18 days of uprising in Egypt in early 2011. Along the way, we became increasingly sceptical 
about what role or what roles the digital media played during the Egyptian uprisings and in particu-
lar we became sceptical towards attributing them a too significant role in the uprisings.  
The enormous followings in the demonstrations in Midan Tahrir did not come about because so 
many young Egyptians shared information and news on the digital media. Many Egyptians obvious-
ly reacted in anger to pictures and news about police brutality and sexual abuse of women by the 
authorities. In this context, it seems as if the Facebook site “We are all Khaled Said” came to make 
a difference. The pictures of the young man, Khaled Said beaten up by two policemen in Alexan-
dria angered many people. The anger probably became so strong because so many Egyptians per-
sonally had experienced police brutality and abuse by the authorities. This assumption forced the 
project to focus much more on the living conditions of ordinary Egyptians. Not least, we found it 
necessary to look into the social and political conditions and into the economic living conditions in 
Egypt around 2010.  
However, the assumption that the Egyptians reacted in so big numbers in early 2011 due to frustra-
tions over the social, political and economic conditions does hardly produce the full story about the 
uprisings even if it is combined with the special role of the digital media. The demonstrations and 
the way the demonstrators behaved, and not least the very heterogeneous composition of the partic-
ipants, made us wonder: were these mass gatherings just to be described as ordinary popular pro-
tests, or as an ordinary grass root movement?  To us it was puzzling as it appeared as something 
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new or something different from ordinary grass root movements where the participants very often 
are tied together because of a common cause; be it protection of the environment, labour rights, 
protest against new motorways etc. It was not obvious from the beginning if there was a common 
cause for the demonstrators even though they soon developed one common goal, namely the re-
moval of Hosni Mubarak.  
This third element of puzzlement inspired us to look into the theoretical debate distinguishing be-
tween ‘traditional collective action’ and new forms of popular action called ‘connective action’. 
The idea of connective action turned our attention towards what could be unique features character-
ising the uprisings of Midan Tahrir. The theory of connective action argues what is unique about 
some of the mass movements of today is the wish or the drive for action and not so much a common 
goal of changing something to the better for example the environment. Therefore, mass movements 
are also described as ‘non-movements’. 
Based on this theoretical inspiration, the project launches an overall argument stating the Egyptian 
uprisings in Midan Tahrir were an example of connective action where the participants were united 
in two ways: First, they wanted action even though for numerous different reasons and second, they 
joined the non-movement of Midan Tahrir with one aim in common namely the removal of Hosni 
Mubarak. As already indicated, the hundreds of thousands of Egyptians did not take to the streets 
just like that. There was a comprehensive frustration in the Egyptian population due to the unsatis-
fying and unacceptable situation in the country and that definitely contributed to explaining the 
strong and quick following to the demonstrations. And so does the extensive use of the digital me-
dia. 
These assumptions helped us formulate a number of sub-questions. The first sub-question asks what 
role the digital media played during the 18 days of uprising in Midan Tahrir. The second sub-
question asks how the societal conditions in Egypt were around the time of the Uprisings. Specifi-
cally, it asks how the situations were as far as political rights and the legal protections of the citi-
zens concerned and also, how the living conditions were for those living in the big Egyptian cities. 
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The third sub-question asks who the participants were in the enormous gatherings and if it is possi-
ble to characterise the participants. 
By answering the three sub-questions, we are able to conclude that the uprisings of the 18 days of 
Midan Tahrir were a non-movement characterised by the very diverse background of the partici-
pants which makes us conclude that the uprisings were an expression of connective action. It was 
promoted and helped forward by deep felt frustrations over the general standard of living in the 
country and also helped forward by the information and encouragements within the digital media. 
 
Research question 
 
Within few hours, the word was spread via the digital media that people would gather in Cairo’s 
Midan Tahrir on January 25, 2011 to protest against the widespread police brutality in Egypt. Tens 
of thousands followed the call and went to the centrally situated square with the strong symbolic 
name Freedom or liberty. The surprisingly vast amount of protester, the rapidity of the action and 
the perseverance and the endurance of the protesters made us ask the question; 
Why and how did the uprisings in Egypt’s Tahrir Square take the form they did? 
 
In order to answer the question, the project raises three sub-questions. 
The first sub-question is, what role did the digital media play during the 18 days of uprising in Mi-
dan Tahrir? 
The project works with the assumption that the digital media were crucial instruments of communi-
cation and thereby important instruments of organising the demonstrations during the 18 days.  
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The second sub-question is, how was the socio-political situation and also how were the living con-
ditions in Egypt for the ordinary citizens?  
The project works with the fundamental assumption that the massive political repression in Egypt in 
combination with the political marginalisation of the majority of Egyptians was important precondi-
tions for the huge following to the uprisings. Even more so, the fast increasing poverty in combina-
tion with high unemployment rates for not least young and well-educated city dwellers was also a 
crucial explanation to why so many people took to the streets. 
The third sub-question is, who were the participants in the demonstrations and what were their 
characteristics?  
The project assumes that the uprisings were the expression of a kind of postmodern protest move-
ment mainly made up of people who were seeking action but with very diverse backgrounds and 
reasons.  
 
Historical background 
 
Until the evening of the popular uprisings in Egypt January 25, 2011, Egypt had been a military 
dictatorship since the military took power in 1952. All three presidents in the period 1952 to 2011 
had a military background. At the time they took over power they were still active soldiers wearing 
their officer uniforms. Gamal Abdel Nasser was a colonel when he led the removal of the kingdom 
in 1952. When he died from a heart attack in 1970, his vice-president Anwar al Sadat was sworn in 
as President, a position he maintained until he was assassinated in 1981. Furthermore, Anwar al 
Sadat was an officer when he came into office. The same was the case for his successor President 
Hosni Mubarak who remained President until he was removed from power on February 11, 2011, 
after 18 days of protests and demonstrations. Like his two predecessors, Hosni Mubarak was an 
officer. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that took power in Egypt on February 
11, 2011, in the name of the military (Galal 2011) was as the name indicates consisting of military 
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persons basically meaning that the lack of civilian rule continued after the removal of Hosni Mu-
barak. 
The SCAF came to rule a country which faced problems in both economic and political terms. 
Egypt was the most populous country in the Arab world with 85 million inhabitants. It is important 
to note that the population of Egypt was largely homogenous, young and relatively well-educated 
(Galal 2011, p. 7). In spite of economic growth rates close to 5 % per year from 2008 to 2010 (ibid, 
p. 5), it was far from enough to create sufficient productive jobs to absorb the new entrants into the 
labour market. The registered unemployment was constantly around 9 % for the entire working 
force but it reached no less than 21 % for the youth aged 15-24 (ibid, p. 3). The informal sector in 
Egypt accounted for 30 % of the GDP and employed some 40 % of the labour force (ibid, p. 3). 
Poverty was widespread in Egypt during the years leading up to the January 2011 uprisings. When 
Egypt in the early 1990s began to implement structural adjustment reforms in the economy, the 
government in Cairo embarked on a campaign privatising the state owned companies. One of the 
consequences of the privatisation policy was that the percentage of Egyptians living for less than 2 
US dollars per day remained to be 20 % and the real wages for the workers stagnated (Fadel 2011, 
p. 294). So liberalisation might have brought economic growth, but it certainly was not evenly dis-
tributed as the already well-off segments of the population reaped the benefits of the economic 
growth which followed the structural adjustment programs and the privatisations promoted by the 
World Bank (ibid, p. 294). 
These dire figures came after almost 35 years of liberalised economy under the headline ‘Infitah’ or 
‘open door’ economy initially launched by President Anwar Al Sadat in the mid-1970s. “Succes-
sive, though unsuccessful, reform programs during the 1990s contributed to the pervasive poverty 
that served as a central driver of the 2011 Egyptian revolution”, it is stated by Saif (2011, p. 1). In 
early 2011, the Egyptian economy was vulnerable for a number of reasons. Foreign earnings were 
crucial to the overall Egyptian economy but they were far from stable. The country was highly de-
pendent on remittances from some 200.000 Egyptian citizens working in Libya. In 2010, the remit-
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tances from these workers amounted to around 800 billion US dollars (Springborg 2011, p. 428). 
After the uprisings in Libya a big percentage of these workers had to flee the country and return to 
Egypt, meaning most of this kind of foreign earnings disappeared (ibid, p. 428). Secondly, the gas 
exports to Israel and Jordan were important; however this foreign exchange earner was also vulner-
able as it had been interrupted several times because of sabotage (ibid, p. 428). Thirdly tourism, 
which around 2010/2011 employed one in seven Egyptian workers, fluctuated very much and was 
highly vulnerable to political changes and/or terrorism (ibid, p. 428). 
As mentioned, Egypt had been a military dictatorship since the 1952 revolution led by Colonel 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. There is some debate in the literature on whether Egypt in 2011 was a mili-
tary state or civilian state (Salem 2013, p. 2). However, it can be argued that the power and influ-
ence of the military was weakened by other actors which were gaining increasing control over the 
Egyptian economy concurrently with the economic liberalisation (Salem 2013). Under Hosni Mu-
barak a new economic elite emerged of which Mubarak’s son Gamal was a key figure who became 
a leader of the new economic class, promoted by the neo-liberal economic policies pursued under 
Mubarak (ibid, p. 3). During the years before the uprisings started in late January 2011, it appeared 
that this new economic elite had monopolised the Egyptian economy but at the same time, it relied 
heavily on the police and the security forces (ibid, p. 3). Mohammad Fadel claims that not only cor-
ruption but also torture was widespread and a characteristic feature of the Mubarak regime. He ex-
plicitly stated “Mubarak used his powers under the Constitution of 1971 to subvert the enforcement 
of Egyptian law in order to benefit himself, his family and their allies” (Fadel 2011, p. 293). 
It is worth noting that the new economic alliance between the regime and the new economic class 
with Gamal Mubarak, as a key figure in Egyptian politics, apparently accepted systematic rigging 
of elections and also the increasing brutality by the security forces. This created considerable unrest 
in the Egyptian society (Salem 2013). This political dissatisfaction occurred in a situation where 
inflations ran at 11 % per year making it difficult for many families to survive (Salem 2013, p. 3; 
Galal 2011, p. 5). 
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The bleak economic prospects for the majority of Egyptians were closely linked to the perception 
that corruption was widespread in the country, and that the level of corruption in itself had become 
an obstacle to economic well-being. A survey among the Egyptians showed that as many as 88 % of 
the population considered low wages as a side effect of corruption. Likewise, many interpreted in-
creases in commodity prices as a consequence of systematic corruption (Freedom House 2011, p. 
8). The survey also indicated that more than 40 % of small and medium-sized enterprises made ille-
gal payments to operate (ibid, p. 8). 
Looking at the social and political situation in the country before the Arab Spring started, it is not 
difficult to understand why the Egyptians were so discontent and angry with the government, and 
why thoughts of protests were not far from mind. 
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Chapter 1: Methods and theories 
The following chapter will clarify the procedure through the project. The considerations and choic-
es, as well as exclusions are based on the researcher's’ view of importance. The choices of theory 
are likewise tightly connected to the sources point of interest. First, the choices within methodology 
will be clarified, followed by explanations of the methods used in the project. Finally, the theoreti-
cal framework and underlying theories makes the foundation for the project’s angle and viewpoint. 
 
Methodology 
This project is based on data collected from literature within the field of research on the Arab 
Spring. The theories and theoretical framework is based on the work of researchers who specialise 
in social movements. The methodology section reflects the subjectivity of the researchers and states 
the reflexivity of the researchers in the project. 
 
Reflexivity of the Researchers 
The reflexivity of this project will be stated to justify and reason for the choices of epistemology 
and ontology which follows. As outside researchers, with no connection to the Arab countries or the 
Arab revolution in Egypt, we acknowledge that we do not know the specific motivations or cultural 
habits of the subjects in research. The actions and reactions made by the subjects are researched and 
interpreted with the theoretical framework and the literature used in mind. This project strives to 
study the field with no prejudice or presumptions other than what is achieved through the literature 
read and used, to attain a research, which is as undiscriminating and as ethical as possible. 
Additionally, we have to clarify that while this project researches the importance of digital-, par-
ticularly social media in the Arab Spring, we are aware that the uprisings in Egypt were not exclu-
sively caused by the digital media. The project examines the topic, in a manner that focuses exclu-
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sively on the digital media as an instrument in the actions of the individuals in Egypt, but acknowl-
edges that this is not the reason for the revolution or the actions of the individual. 
Furthermore, our approach requires that we interpret the events surrounding the average citizen in 
Egypt leading up to and during the revolts in Tahrir Square in Cairo from January 25 to February 
11, 2011. The project does not take the opinions and motivations of the government into account. 
The project does not take into account the political, social or economic situation in Egypt or any of 
the Arab countries after the uprisings within the specified timeframe. 
Epistemology 
With these reflections in mind the methodological approach can be set. To achieve the goal of in-
terpreting the subjects in Egypt through gathered literature, the epistemological approach of inter-
pretivism will be used. This means that the project will take the motivations of the people into ac-
count by arguing for how the people and actors reacted, or neglected to do so, during the time of the 
uprisings. The project has a subjective angle, being pro-revolution and generally excluding of the 
opinions and motivations of the pro-government actors. 
Additionally, the project acknowledges that there are many other reasons and angles of approach to 
the Arab Spring and even revolutions in general, but through the theoretical framework the goal is 
to create a foundation that identifies some of the important tendencies that lead to the revolution, 
and a foundation that could presumably be applied to future case studies. 
Ontology 
The project makes use of the constructivist ontological approach in dealing with the topic at hand. 
In doing so, it has to be clarified that the project does not wish to undermine other methods of deal-
ing with the topic at hand. The project makes use of the constructivist ontology in acknowledging 
that the social phenomena leading up to and during the uprisings were created and shaped by social 
actors. Contrary to an objectivist approach, the constructivist approach does not claim that the re-
sults and conclusions achieved in the study are definitive, but rather that the project can contribute 
to the awareness and reflexivity of the reader. 
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Methods 
To research the digital media, the socio-political situation and the protesters of the uprisings in 
Egypt, while using the methodologies as referred above, this project is confined to certain areas of 
methods in answering the research question as clear and effectively as possible. To explain the 
choice and the practice of the methodology, the following section will explain the methods used in 
the project. 
 
Choice of Empirical data 
The project mainly uses secondary sources. Due to language problems in reading Arabic, the pro-
ject for obvious reasons only use written materials, information and data in English. Most of the 
sources will have established interpretations or translations, which the researchers of this project, 
through the insurance of peer review and academic reliability, will consider reliable. Few primary 
sources are used, mainly to obtain dates and opinions of people in the field of research, for example 
the presentation by the revolutionary actor, Wael Ghonim (2012). Additionally, primary data in the 
form of statistical information is used. The empirical data used in the project will primarily come 
from books, journal articles and working papers, but as mentioned, both internet- and video sources 
are used to a limited extent.  
 
Several sources have been used to understand the uprisings and to answer the research question, one 
of the most inspiring sources is the working paper Opening closed regimes: What was the role of 
social media during the Arab Spring? (Howard et al 2011). It is used in the project with the purpose 
of grounding the project with empirical evidence. The paper contains an amount of factual quantita-
tive data, and is supporting the argument that social media was used to a great extent during the 
uprisings. This project uses the data on the demographic of the revolution, to argue of how the peo-
ple of Egypt were intertwined with the digital media and that the revolution was embraced by the 
people through this connection with the media. 
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Another important source is the journal article “The role of digital media” by two of the authors to 
the aforementioned paper, Howard and Hussain (2011). This paper has been used to acquire an 
analysis of the specific influence and use of the digital media, while the paper “Opening closed re-
gimes” had a focus on the demographic and factual data surrounding the Egyptian population. The 
last mentioned paper works more on the political and organisational situation of the movement, and 
will be used accordingly in the project. 
Additionally, the project uses the paper of Kamel (2014); “Egypt’s ongoing uprising and the role of 
social media: is there development” to obtain a deeper understanding of the uprisings, the protesters 
and their motivations as well as the use of digital media and the years before the uprising that led to 
the revolution.  
Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) has taken the direction of applying the resource mobilisation theory, 
which initially emerged in the 1970’s, to the situation in Egypt. Although this research, much like 
this project, has applied theories on the social movements to the contemporary issues, the data used 
is mostly the secondary data which is very intricate on the action during the uprisings in Egypt. This 
paper has been used to understand and analyse the specific actors and movements. 
In chapter 3 dealing with the economic living conditions in Egypt, data from the World Bank are 
used. We consider this type of information valid and use it without any reservations. The same goes 
for the information on the political circumstances in the years immediately before the uprising 
which are used without reservation. The information and the assessments on these issues are from 
the Freedom House 2011 Report. 
 
Analytical approach 
In approaching the subject from an interpretivist and constructivist standpoint, this project will pri-
marily be using the qualitative analysis method. Because of this, the researchers consider them-
selves somewhat subjective in research, through the fact that even the quantitative data gathered 
will be qualitatively analysed and interpreted. Since this project has a particular focus on the time of 
events surrounding the uprisings, even quantitative data, such as the time of creation of a page on 
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social media or the date of governmental actions, will have an essential qualitative value for the 
research. This results in an approach with increased triangulation, because of the use of mixed 
methods, when both qualitative and quantitative data is used. 
The project states that the digital media was an important factor in the intensification of the revolu-
tion, which indicates a deductive approach, with an implicit hypothesis. In fact the project examines 
the subject in a far more iterative manner; since the project discusses the specific importance of 
social media. 
Lastly, it is important to mention that the correlational research method has been considered to 
summarise and analyse the data collected from already existing literature. Since this method does 
not emphasise on the qualitative variables connected to a given subject of research, and generally 
does not align with an interpretivist epistemology, this correlational research method has been ex-
cluded. 
 
Theory 
There are a number of different theoretical approaches to studying Arab politics and political 
change in Arab countries (Pace and Cavatorta 2012, p. 127). For a number of years, the debate was 
concentrated on the prospects of democratic transition based on an assumption of a more or less 
linear path from authoritarian rule to a kind of democracy. Another approach focused on the resili-
ence of authoritarian rule. The study of authoritarian rule and how such regimes survive has been 
particularly preoccupied with the mechanisms that contributed for decades to upholding non-
democratic regimes (ibid, p. 130). The democratic transition approach can be criticised for being 
too strongly focused on the traditional assumptions of how to move from authoritarian rule to de-
mocracy and thereby focussing on particular actors. The authoritarian resilience approach can be 
criticised for not having taken into account the potential unintended consequences of the liberalising 
reform which took place in many Arab countries. Both approaches can be criticised for having an 
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“excessive focus on the state and on traditional actors” (ibid, p. 130). Most probably, these different 
approaches can contribute to an understanding of the uprisings. 
However, this project turns its attention to another set of actors and another set of mechanisms 
which are supposed to be able to contribute to a more profound understanding of the popular upris-
ings in Cairo, Egypt from January 25 to February 11 2011. In the first round, people assembled in 
Midan Tahrir and adjacent streets simply to protest. At least, it was not obvious or explicit what the 
demonstrations aimed at achieving. Based on this observation, we find it relevant to use the theoret-
ical model and reasoning by W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg (2012). The two authors 
make a basic distinction between ‘collective action’ which is the traditional way of popular move-
ments to protest and ‘connective action’ which is a very recent and arguably important way of un-
derstanding popular protest movements. 
Collective action is based on an organisational network where coordination is significant. In collec-
tive action communication between members of an organisation is important. When the participants 
are connected through organisations they become collective. For there to be collective action, there 
are some simple factors which needs to be in play. First, there has to be organisational resources 
and someone has to step up and also somebody has to make sure that everything is organised and 
the participants have their goal in mind. Second, it is important that there is a solid network where a 
number of members can bring in more members and keep them there (Bennett and Segerberg 2012, 
p. 751).           
Collective action is not created by one individual with a purpose but by many individuals sharing 
the same ambitions, beliefs and who also have a number of common goals. Collective action re-
quires organisational skills to function. When having conventional collective action, the members 
have to make difficult choices, because whatever they decide affects a large group of people (Ben-
nett and Segerberg 2012, p. 748). Collective action places a larger demand on the individuals, they 
need to have a common identification to succeed (ibid, p. 747). 
21 
 
Collective action is different from connective action which is much more personalised and not least 
individualised whereas collective action is based on a kind of collective identity. Connective action 
is characterised by having poor involvement from organisational resources. However, the most sig-
nificant difference between the two forms of logic is the personalisation within the connective ac-
tion. By not having a high level of organisational involvement, the personalised action is strength-
ened. For collective action, specific organisations or parties define the structure for the organisa-
tional part setting specific requirement or ideology for participation. For personalised action for-
mation and thereby for connective action, the requirements for participation are lowered by letting 
people share their own personal experiences and thus creating “easy-to-personalize action themes” 
(Bennett and Segerberg 2012). This also results in a larger public involvement, it is argued (ibid, 
pp. 741-743). 
Because most often, there is no organisation behind connective action, the organising mechanisms 
of this type of action involve different types of communication technologies such as social network, 
SMS-messaging, email list etc. These phenomena are called ‘digital networked action (DNA)’ 
(Bennett and Segerberg 2012, p. 743)  which build upon personalised self-organising networks giv-
ing the citizens a feeling that they are fighting for something that is important to them as individuals 
(ibid, pp. 742-743).  At the same time, it is important to emphasise that just because something is 
connective action it does not exclude it from also being collective action. Such a situation is re-
ferred to as the ‘boundary zone’ by Bennett and Segerberg (2012) when connective action gives 
way for collective action (ibid, p. 745). 
 
Theoretical framework 
In continuation of the theory of connective action, the project focuses on social movements and on 
big gatherings of people in more or less organised manner which seem to have been one of the 
characteristic features of the uprisings which took place in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria during 
the Arab spring. It is hardly a coincidence that several times, Bennett and Segerberg refer to the 
uprisings in Cairo as the ‘protest networks’ of Cairo (Bennett and Segerberg 2012, pp. 751, 754). 
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Asef Bayat argues in favour of focusing on so-called ‘street politics’ and on an alternative under-
standing of social movements in what he calls ‘non-movements’ which basically resembles what 
Bennett & Segerberg call ‘connective action, self organizing networks’ (Bayat 2010; Bennett and 
Segerberg 2012, p. 756). 
Street politics or the political street is located in the city and it is “shaped and expressed in the phys-
ical and social space of the streets” (Bayat 2010, p. 11). Social conflicts originate from the active 
use of the public space which is found in the city or which is an integrated part of urban life (ibid, 
pp. 11-12). The streets are the medium through which complete strangers are able to establish 
communication with each other by recognising mutual interests or shared sentiments (ibid, p. 12). 
Basically Bayat (2010) argues that the situation in big cities with millions of inhabitants creates a 
unique situation where all sorts of people with different life experiences and with different interests 
may meet and may act and protest together. In spite that their agendas may differ and their interests 
are different, together they may push for transformation (ibid, p. 14). They are together in their an-
ger and frustration and they are together in the immediate solution, in this case the removal of the 
regime. Apart from this, they may not be in agreement about much else. 
In order to understand dispersed movements and gatherings of very dissimilar people with different 
agendas, Bayat suggests to use the terminology ‘non-movements’ which refers to collective actions 
of non-collective actors (Bayat 2010, p. 14). In an attempt to summarise the characteristics of the 
‘practice in non-movements’, it is stated that the movements tend to be activist and action oriented 
and furthermore, in spite of their common practice of protest, they remain fragmented (ibid, pp. 19-
20). 
By introducing the concepts of street politics and non-movements, Asef Bayat has hinted at the po-
tentially very diverse and fragmented character of the protest movements which arose in Egypt and 
in other Arab countries. They had two things in common: On the one hand, they reacted to the calls 
for protest sent out via the digital media but they reacted for very different reasons. On the other 
hand, they reacted to a societal state of affairs which they found unsatisfactory and frustrating. 
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Summing up, the project suggests using a model which integrates the role of the digital media with 
the socio-political circumstances in Egypt in a general explanatory framework which maintains a 
clear focus on the role of the non-movements and thus on street politics. The model is shown in 
figure 1 stressing that connective action and the self-organising networks supply the core explanato-
ry variables condensed in the concept street politics.  
Figure 1: Model of the Egyptian uprising  
 
Figure 1 is used to structure the analysis and to help interpret the data and information on the pro-
test movements in Midan Tahrir during the 18 days in early 2011. The model points at street poli-
tics and at the self-organising networks as the core explanatory elements to be applied in order to 
understand what happened in Egypt and particularly in Cairo. The model also points at the socio-
economic circumstances as important and supplementary explanatory elements. Finally, the model 
points at the digital media as another supplementary explanatory variable. 
In sum, the model supplies the following explanatory elements or hypotheses: First, the movement 
or movements were composed by individuals with very few attitudes and agendas in common. As 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012) state, these protests can be understood as personal expressions which 
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are shared over social networks building on personal actions frames (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, p. 
756). The individuals were only assembled by one common goal, the removal of the Mubarak re-
gime. Second, the individuals reacted to what they considered as unsatisfactory socio-political cir-
cumstances be it high unemployment rates, poverty, discrimination of women, youth etc. Thus, the 
research task is to indicate or make probable that the socio-economic circumstances was a strong 
enough reason for the non-movement to act and to protest i.e. making street politics. Third, the digi-
tal media was the instrument that made it possible for the individuals to communicate and to make 
street politics. It is the task for this research to indicate and make probable that the digital media 
was the tool of communication, which presupposes that these new media were widespread not least 
in Cairo and other big Egyptian cities. 
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Chapter 2: Digital media as an instrument 
This chapter addresses the first sub-question asking what role or roles the digital media played dur-
ing the uprisings in Midan Tahrir. The assumption of the project states that the digital media was 
the core instrument helping the demonstrators to communicate and thus the media were instrumen-
tal in organising the demonstrations and thereby making ‘street politics’ in Egypt in early 2011. The 
chapter therefore aims at demonstrating that the digital media contributed to organise the uprisings; 
but it is not the expectation or assumption that they created the uprisings. The digital media helped 
the protesters to communicate with each other and thereby they created the knowledge about 
demonstrations and protests under way. As stated by Howard and Hussain (2011) the protesters 
“were not inspired by Facebook; they were inspired by the real tragedies documented on Facebook” 
(Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 48) 
 
Sherif H. Kamel (2014) argues strongly that the digital media was a key driver in the Egyptian up-
rising. Based on the argument, it is pertinent briefly to give an overview of how the media has de-
veloped in the Arab Middle East. One point of view in the academic debate is that the the media has 
gradually evolved through two technological phases for media and communication that both failed 
in creating change, followed by the third phase which finally succeeded in engaging the people. 
The first phase is the one of traditional media and mass media. This first phase was when traditional 
media was the prominent media in Egypt. The national press, with the largest circulation of daily 
printed press was owned by the Supreme Press Council (SPC) and The Shura Council. The SPC, 
established in 1975, were authorised to issue licences to publish and practise journalism, while the 
Shura Council, formed in 1980 as the upper house of parliament legally owned the national press 
(Rugh 2004, p. 122). Since both of these organisations were controlled by the regime’s political 
party and the president had the ability to appoint the chief editors, the reliability has to be ques-
tioned. Additionally, in 1998 a law was passed that required that papers owned by joint stock com-
panies had to have the prime-minister’s approval (ibid, p. 122). 
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Political parties were legally allowed to publish their own newspapers, and even the opposition had 
their own newspaper, al-shaab, which was suspended in 2003, leading to the major political opposi-
tion parties to propagate their views in critique of the government from vehicles (Rugh 2004, p. 
122). While these vehicles could announce their messages on the street, and to the broad audience 
that would then hear them, it did not lead to any revolutionary change. The reason for this could be 
argued to be that people would have to take official action as individuals, which could be seen and 
acted on by the government. People feared acting because they did not know if others shared the 
same ideas as themselves (TED.com 2011). The reason for the lack of success from this source 
would be that the participation would be too public, and people were not encouraged and were too 
scared to participate. 
During the second phase the Egyptians largely had access to e-mail and instant message services. 
These services, while they can instantly reach out to a broad audience with no immediate interfer-
ence from the government to censor or limit the communication, were limited to communication 
between people with shared contact information. Howard et al (2011) argue that the people in the 
Arab countries were generally tech-savvy with 67 mobile phones for every 100 people, which im-
plies the use of text-messaging between the Egyptians (Howard et al 2011, pp. 5-6). This predeces-
sor to the social media as known in Facebook, Twitter, YouTube or other platforms for interactive 
media, was halted by the fact that people had to seek out the information, which, contrary to the 
first phase, culminated in a lack of public access. 
The third and until now the final phase in this context is the era of digital and social media, connect-
ing the success of both the phase of traditional media and the phase of instant messaging. This 
phase had public access through a media which was not controlled by the government, so people 
could access the information through their everyday life, without seeking it out, and even act anon-
ymously to the government (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 36). The social media made it possible 
for the most prominent actors to reach a broad audience with their protest messages without their 
messages being muffled by government interference. It helped connect the citizens with one another 
and helped them to “realize that they could take shared action regarding shared grievances” (ibid, p. 
41). Additionally, the Egyptians receiving the messages did not have to look for it, or even initially 
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be aware of the movements, since their usual online affairs would have a high possibility of leading 
them to the content through viral spread (Ghonim 2011, pp. 74-79). 
 
In sum, it can be argued that the digital media helped to close the wide gap between the different 
social classes and thereby created a more or less unified group of anti-government protesters 
(Kamel 2014, p. 83). The digital media played the role of distributing information and also creating 
visibility for discussion, not least for a computer literate young population. The digital media 
helped to speed-up the mobilisation of people with different agendas and different concerns (ibid, p. 
83). Apart from providing information about what was happening in and around the country, the 
digital media made it possible for people to “build extensive networks, create social capital, and 
organize political action with a speed and on a scale never seen before” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 
pp. 35-36).  
In 2011, the Egyptians were massive users of the internet. They were the second largest users in the 
region and therefore the organisers of the protests were able to reach countless of Egyptians via 
digital media (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 38). Internet penetration in Egypt was only 30 %. 
However, in Cairo it was more than 64 % of the households that had internet and at least 50 % of 
the country’s internet subscribers (dial-up) were located in Cairo. Furthermore, around 5 million 
Facebook users could be located in Egypt (Lim 2012, p. 235). Also, YouTube was very popular 
among young Egyptians (ibid, p. 235). Merlyna Lim concludes that “these data suggest that social 
media are the media of the urban youth” (ibid, p. 235).  Digital media provided connections within 
and also between movements and thereby making it possible to increase participation in demonstra-
tions and meetings. It made it possible for protesters to organise protest “in unexpected ways that 
made it difficult for states to respond.” (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 43). Through digital media, 
the people of Egypt created a system to communicate and arrange political action which could not 
be controlled by the state (ibid, p. 36). Howard and Hussain make an interesting point when stating 
that “There are many ways to tell the story of political change. But one of the most consistent narra-
tives from civil society leaders in Arab countries has been that the Internet, mobile phones and so-
cial media such as Facebook and Twitter made the difference this time.” (ibid, p. 35). 
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The lack of government control manifested itself when the government shut down the internet in an 
attempt to stop the protests which in no way prevented the protesters from carrying on. Instead peo-
ple used their mobile phones to communicate with their social networks and calling them to join the 
uprisings. Information about how to use landlines was spread and thus making it possible for the 
protesters to bypass state blockages (Howard and Hussain 2011, pp. 38-40). Not only did the gov-
ernment fail in preventing information circulation but the effect of the blockages backfired. It had 
the opposite effect, resulting in more people taking to the streets and joining the protest as a simple 
reaction of wondering what was going on (ibid, p. 39). Additionally, the government lost at least 90 
million US dollars, and lost many technology investors (ibid, p. 44) 
 
Mobiles phones and more traditional media were extensively used to communicate and coordinate 
protests. Average participants and activist leaders used Twitter, Al Jazeera’s social media feed and 
the interactive Websites of CNN and the BBC to reach beyond Tahrir square, Merlyna Lim argues 
(Lim 2012, p. 243). Her overall conclusion is that the digital media in Egypt helped the protesters 
and the popular movements in and around Tahrir square in expanding the sphere of participation not 
least by reaching the country’s unemployed and dissatisfied urban youth. These media “helped cre-
ate fertile context for revolution and were essential during the heady days of Tahrir Square protests” 
(ibid, p. 244). 
 
Summing up, there seems to be general agreement among the sources consulted that the digital me-
dia played a remarkably prominent role as a mean of communication and thereby contributed sig-
nificantly to organising the many different gatherings and protest marches during the Tahrir upris-
ings. It leads to two preliminary observations. One, without the widespread distribution of digital 
media not least in Cairo the uprising may not have had the remarkable followings day by day for 18 
days. It implies that the initial protesters of January 25 may never have succeeded the way they did 
if not for Facebook, Twitter etc. Second, the area of state control of information in Egypt might 
have gone for ever. With it, the government’s ability to control and dominate the public sphere 
might also have gone for ever. The latter observation appears promising for those who want to 
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change the undemocratic system and equally threatening for those who want to oppose fundamental 
changes. 
Chapter 3: Socio-political circumstances 
The second sub-question addresses the issues of political rights and repression in Egypt and also 
asks how the economic living conditions of the ordinary Egyptians looked like in the years before 
the uprisings started in early 2011. The relevance of these issues builds on an assumption that living 
conditions comprising both political and economic conditions played an important role in explain-
ing the start and the character of the uprisings. Issues such as high unemployment rates for young 
Egyptians, poverty, discrimination, police brutality and political marginalisation contributed to a 
general discontent in many segments of the Egyptian society. The aim of this chapter is thus to 
make it probable that many people felt a strong frustration over the socio-political situation in Egypt 
in early 2011. 
There seems to have been all the reasons in the world to protest against police repression and abuse. 
According to the 2011 Freedom House Reports, torture was common even though it was largely 
reserved for men but widespread sexual abuse of women was carried out by the security services 
(Freedom House 2011, p. 4).  
It was hardly a coincidence that the protest started on January 25, 2011. January 25 is the National 
Police Day in Egypt and the day had on several occasions been the aim for protests (Lim 2012, p. 
242). Once again there were plans of protest on the 25th of January in 2011 against police brutality. 
When Wael Ghonim invited “We are all Khaled Said”’s followers to protest on the National Police 
Day more than 50.000 clicked “yes” (Lim 2012, p. 242).  Abuse by police and security personnel 
was sometimes fatal. The death of Khaled Said by the policy in Alexandria gave name to the site 
“We are all Khaled Said”. Freedom House states that his death “came to symbolize the authorities’ 
unchecked aggression and lack of legal accountability in the Late Mubarak period” (Freedom 
House 2011, p. 4). 
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The site “We are all Khaled Said” was formed on Facebook. It was founded on pictures of Khaled 
Said lying dead and beaten up after being confronted by two police officers. Khaled Said was a 
young man from Alexandria and was, at the moment when he was approached by the police offic-
ers, patronising an internet café. According to media reports and bloggers, the officers demanded 
money from Said, and when he told them he did not have it, they started beating him (Eltantawy 
and Wiest 2011, pp. 1211-1212).  
The pictures of the beating up of the young Khaled by the police were shared on the internet while 
the Mubarak regime protected the two police officers (Freedom House 2011, p. 4). The pictures of 
Said appealed to the fear and discontent amongst the people because they could relate to it or at 
least to the situation of oppression by the authorities. It paved the way for the Egyptian people to 
reflect their own fears and experiences within the autocracy and in particular the people could see 
the reactions from the world outside Egypt. Merlyna Lim argued that the story of Khaled Said can 
be read or understood as “a culmination of the longstanding online campaign against torture” (Lim 
2012, p. 241). The “We are all Khaled Said” movement had a particularly strong impact on all those 
demonstrating against the Egyptian authorities. “The story and the images of the torture of Khaled 
Said personified the injustice and brutalities of the Mubarak regime and thus intensified the emotion 
of opposition movement” (Lim 2012, p. 241-242). 
The general assessment of the state of affairs for the civil liberties in Egypt in early January 2011 
seems to be fairly clear. The regimes relied heavily on violence to maintain power and brutality 
against the civilian population “was routine and often calculated”, it is concluded (Freedom House 
2011, p.5). Also, it has to be mentioned that there was discrimination against the Egyptian Coptic 
minority even though Freedom House states that this type of discrimination “was common (…) but 
not systematic” (Freedom House 2011, p. 5). 
According to the Freedom House 2011 report “the Egyptian government frequently violated the 
civil and political rights of its citizens in the final years of Mubarak’s presidency. Torture and arbi-
trary detentions became commonplace. The freedom of assembly and association which had always 
been subject to surveillance by the security services were hampered by additional restrictions” 
(Freedom House 2011, p. 1). 
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The Mubarak government looked upon civil society activism as a threat to its security, it is stated 
by Freedom House (Freedom House 2011). In 2002, the regimes adopted a law regulating non-
governmental organisations in the country. It gave the security authorities wide possibilities to in-
terfere into the activities and operations of this type of organisation. Freedom House finds that the 
law “effectively put Egypt’s growing and fearless civil society sector at the mercy of a state that 
could act arbitrarily” (ibid, p. 6). In early 2010, a group of 41 NGOs issued a statement condemning 
what they described as the “militarization” of the Egyptian civil society (ibid, p. 6). 
Turning towards the legal system in Egypt, it is worth noting that when commenting on the issue of 
legal independence Freedom House puts forwards one of its less critical assessments of the final 
years of the Mubarak regime. The deterioration of judicial independence was “not as sharp as the 
deterioration in other areas such as civil liberties, government accountability and corruption” (Free-
dom House 2011, p. 7). 
A survey among Egyptians showed that as many as 88 % of the population considered low wages a 
side effect of corruption. Likewise, many interpreted increases in commodity prices as a conse-
quence of systematic corruption (Freedom House 2011, p. 8). It was not just surveys and studies 
that criticised the level of corruption. In 2009, the issue was raised in the Egyptian parliament. 
Moreover, ‘Transparency International’ ranked Egypt number 98 out of 178 countries in its 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Egypt scored a mere 3.1 on the index’s 10-point scale with 10 being 
the least corrupt (ibid, p. 8). Corruption was widespread during the rule of Mubarak and it pervaded 
most aspects of daily life. Corruption took the form of bribery and the exploitation of personal con-
nections to obtain government assistance or facilitate basic bureaucratic transactions such as pro-
cessing of applications for birth documents, passports and driver’s licenses (ibid, p. 8). 
When it comes to civil liberties, Freedom House 2011 Report stated that there was a use of torture 
even though it was largely reserved for men. At the same time, there was widespread of sexual 
abuse of women by the security services (Freedom House 2011, p. 4). Abuse by police and security 
personnel was sometimes fatal. For example, as it was documented in the case of the death of 
Khaled Said by the police in Alexandria. Freedom House stated that his death “came to symbolize 
the authorities’ unchecked aggression and lack of legal accountability in the late Mubarak period” 
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(ibid, p. 4). The regime relied heavily on violence to maintain power, and brutality against the civil-
ian population “was routine and often calculated” (ibid, p. 5). In the same line, the Freedom House 
(2011) stated “the Egyptian government frequently violated the civil and political rights of its citi-
zens in the final years of Mubarak’s presidency. Torture and arbitrary detentions became common-
place. The freedoms of assembly and association which had always been subject to surveillance by 
the security forces, were hampered by additional restriction” (Freedom House 2011, p.1) 
As far as public accountability and the public voice are concerned, Freedom House is quite clear 
and outspoken stating that the Mubarak regime “orchestrated” the election results. And the electoral 
framework was so skewed towards Mubarak’s party, the National Democratic Party, that vote rig-
ging on elections day was basically superfluous. Moreover, voter lists and balloting procedures 
were so deeply flawed that most Egyptian declined to participate, it is argued (Freedom House 
2011, p. 2). The 2010 parliamentary elections are described as the “most fraudulent in the country’s 
history” (ibid, p. 3). Freedom House concludes its analysis by stating “the rigged balloting certainly 
gave Egyptians an additional reason to mobilize against the regime when the opportunity presented 
itself” (ibid, p. 3) as it did on January 25 in 2011. When summarising the situation concerning the 
political grievances in Egypt in early 2011, Sherif Kamel emphasises that the anger against the Mu-
barak regime was linked to the level of corruption, lawlessness, unemployment and the general vio-
lation of human rights (Kamel 2014, p. 79).  
Turning towards the economic situation, Ahmed Galal argues that the development under Hosni 
Mubarak was flawed. “It favored the ruling elite and large private businesses. Large owners of capi-
tal were given preference over workers, farmers and consumers” (Galal 2011, pp. 3-4). According 
to Galal the basic flaw means that whereas the already well-of segments of the Egyptian popula-
tions became even richer during the later years of the Mubarak regime, large segments of the popu-
lations ended up being worse of. This strange situation was caused by a situation where Egypt expe-
rienced quite significant growth rates in the economy while at the same time, the benefits from this 
growth did not trickle down through job creation. As it is stated “trickle down was taking too long” 
(ibid, p. 3). 
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The development model of the Mubarak era primarily focussed on accelerating investments in the 
private sector both from within Egypt itself and not least from abroad in form of Foreign Direct 
Investments. Egypt was following the so-called Washington Consensus which was an economic 
policy following advice from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund advising mini-
mal state interventions and most freedom for the private initiative (Galal 2011, p.2). The success of 
this model was mainly measured by the magnitude of capital inflows, exchange rate stability and 
economic growth. Based on these criteria, the development in Egypt under Mubarak was a success. 
Foreign direct investments peaked. Annual economic growth rates averaged 7  % during the years 
2006 to 2008 only to reach around 5 % per year right before the uprisings in Midan Tahrir broke out 
in early 2011 (ibid, p. 3). 
In spite of these remarkable figures indicating success of the development model, large segments of 
the Egyptian population was left behind or outside this successful development. “The question that 
was asked repeatedly by many Egyptian was: where did all the benefits from growth go? This ques-
tions went largely unanswered because the necessary data to systematically assess the evolution of 
income and wealth distribution were either not collected in the first place or not made available, 
perhaps deliberately” (Galal 2011, p. 3). Thus according to the analysis of Ahmed Galal the Egyp-
tian development model pursued under Mubarak was characterised by an interesting and also ex-
tremely important conclusion. On the one hand, the macro-economic indicators were extraordinary 
positive while on the other hand the trickle down or the spread of the benefits from the economic 
growth were basically not distributed to the majority of the population. It is not to be neglected that 
Galal (2011) also mentions that many relevant figures related to the Egyptian economy were hard to 
find if not impossible to find (ibid, 3). 
In sum for the past 20 to 30 years, the economic conditions did not meet the expectations of the 
growing populations that suffered from an illiteracy rate of around 40 % and an unemployment rate 
close to 10% as already mentioned (Galal 2011, p. 3). For his part, Sherif Kamel argues that “while 
the overall economic figures were showing improvement, the progress over the period 2000 to 2011 
did not trickle down to positively affect the masses” (Kamel 2014, p. 79). This particular observa-
tion seems important as it turns the attention towards two important factors. On the one hand, the 
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majority of Egyptians did not experience an improvement in the standard of living for a number of 
years. On the other hand, some became richer while the rest remained in more or less severe pov-
erty. It is not to be excluded that the latter element, the increasing and obvious inequality among 
Egyptians, is an important element explaining the huge following to the uprising. 
Youth unemployment was high. In 2006, it was around 17,5 % for the age group 20 to 29 year olds, 
while it was around 14,6 % for the 15 to 19 year olds. In 2006, the overall rate of unemployment in 
Egypt was at 8,3 % (World Bank 2008). The World Bank Report further point out that unemploy-
ment was highest among technical secondary graduates. As to the university graduates, they were 
the only group that had experienced an increase in unemployment from 1998 to 2006 (World Bank 
2008). To this comes the fact that unemployment rates were even higher in Cairo compared to the 
national rate (Lim 2012, p. 235). World Bank figures for the year 2010 indicate that a quarter of the 
youth was unemployed that year (World Bank 2010) which indicate a remarkable increase from 
2006. Here, it is important to mention that young people aged 25-29 made up one third of the coun-
try’s total population and this age group grew significantly in size from 1988 to 2011, leading to a 
massive pressure on the labour market (Lim 2012, p. 234). 
Probably the most important figures explaining the mounting grievances in the Egyptian population 
are related to the general poverty in the country. In 2010, no less than 25 % of the total population 
was registered below the poverty line, in 1999 it was 16,7 % (World Bank 2010) which represents 
an alarming increase. It means that Egypt over a period of only 11 years experienced an increase in 
8,3 percent point equivalent to an 49,7 % increase in the overall level of poverty. It has to be em-
phasised that this dramatic increase took place in a situation where the total amount of Egyptian 
increased from 76 millions in 2006 to 82 millions in 2010 (World Bank 2010) implying that many 
more hundreds of thousands of Egyptians ended up in poverty along with the many millions already 
living in poverty. The figure indicating that 25 % of the populations lived under the poverty line 
means that some 20 million Egyptians lived in poverty during the years immediately preceding the 
uprisings. It seems a reasonable assumption that such a negative development contributed strongly 
to the mounting frustrations in the population which was emphasised by the striking increase in the 
level of poverty. 
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Summing up, the chapter has presented reports on the widespread political repression and political 
marginalisation characterising the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. The chapter also presented in-
formation on the economic situation which indicated that the daily lives of millions of Egyptians 
were highly unsatisfying. In this context, it was probably most important that there was a steep in-
crease of almost 50 % in the level of poverty in the country in the years leading up to the January 
2011 uprisings. In this chapter and in the previous one, it was mentioned that many Egyptians were 
unhappy and frustrated by the political as well as the economic conditions of life. Therefore, it was 
hardly surprising that so many people so quickly joined the protests when the information and the 
encouragement to gather and show their dissatisfaction in Midan Tahrir appeared on Facebook and 
on other digital media. As it is concluded in the analysis of Sherif Kamel “Egypt’s uprising took 
place because of the will of the people for a better life, democracy, freedom, bread and social jus-
tice for all Egyptians” (Kamel 2014, p. 89). 
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Chapter 4: The Street politics of the 18 days in Midan Tahrir 
Finally turning to the third sub-questions asking who the participants in the uprisings in Midan Tah-
rir were and what were their characteristics. It is the assumption of the project that the uprising can 
be understood as a kind of postmodern movement or rather non-movement. This type of movement 
is characterised by having followers who are seeking action while at the same time, they share very 
few common agendas or goals. Nathan Swanson argues in line with the assumption that the protest 
movements in Egypt in early 2011 were composed of individuals with very few attitudes and agen-
das in common and therefore. It is argued that the protests to a large extent can be understood as 
personal or individual expressions which were only linked to each other by one common goal 
namely the removal of the Mubarak regime (Swanson 2014, p. 2). Thus, the aim of the chapter is to 
indicate that the motives for joining the protest movements of the 18 days in Midan Tahrir were 
quite diverse and therefore the individual characteristics were likewise very diverse.  
It is possible to describe the development of the demonstrations as something that took place in no 
less than six phases according to Howard and Hussain (2011, pp. 41-42). They argue that the first 
stage consists of a period where the activists, through digital media, gathered the tools to build soli-
darity and shared grievances, as well as to identify the political goals. The point of creating solidari-
ty and for the individuals of Egypt to identify their shared fears or grievances was also a main point 
from Ghonim (2011) on why the revolution had not been started earlier, and why digital media was 
such an important instrument in furthering the cause. 
The second stage is referred to as the ignition of the uprisings. This stage was characterised by a 
particular event that kick-started the revolts amongst the people. This stage was surprisingly charac-
terised by the absence of ideological leaders, and the revolution had to be ignited by remarkable 
events. In Tunisia it was Bouazizi’s suicide, which also was argued to have started, or ignited, the 
uprisings for the entire Arab Spring. In Egypt the events to kick-start the revolution could be argued 
to be the inspiration from Tunisia through digital media (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 43). It could 
also be argued that the the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said”, created on the grounds of the 
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police brutality practised towards Said, was the turning point for the case in Egypt (Eltantawy and 
Wiest 2011, p. 1212). 
The third stage is the street protests which were made possible when the digital media made net-
working and coordination easier for the guiding actors of the revolution (Howard and Hussain 2011, 
p. 42). It was seen that the actors of the revolution used the digital media, and in particular the so-
cial media, to communicate the specific details of the revolution; details such as dates and clothing 
for the revolution, as well as urging people to make further use of the social media to spread the 
message of the revolution (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, pp. 1213-1214). 
The international buy-in is the fourth stage, involving the inclusion of the issue by global mass me-
dia organisations, and general attention by the global society (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 42). 
This form of attention made it complicated for the Egyptian government to suppress the revolution, 
since the seed had already been irreversibly spread, and a sudden break in communication coming 
out from Egypt, as seen on January 28 (Howard et. al. 2011). 
The fifth state is the climax, which was when the regime tried to get the protesters off the streets, 
and thereby recognising the immediate danger to their position of power. The fact that the govern-
ment started to act, actually strengthened the efforts of the activists, since they could see that their 
actions had an actual effect on the regime, achieving some of the change that they had been reach-
ing for (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 42). 
Such a change requires a number of things condensed by the term WUNC displayed by Charles 
Tilly (2004, 2006 cited in Bennett & Segerberg 2012). It is considered a vital term in relation to 
understanding the potential for change promoted by social movements. WUNC as an abbreviation 
consisting of Worthiness; which is expressed when the cause is recognised and accepted as valid by 
other organisations or prominent societies. Unity; is represented through the solidarity expressed 
through the good order and structure e.g. matching clothes, coordinated dance or marching, chant-
ing of slogans, human chain created by linking of arms etc. Numbers; is expressed on the amount of 
participants. Commitment; is reflected in the continuous presence and delegations to the cause and 
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sustainable support (Tilly 2004, 2006 cited in Bennett & Segerberg 2012, p. 740; Koopmans and 
Statham, 1999, p. 261). 
With the protest in the streets of Egypt in 2011, Tilly’s principles of WUNC can be applied. The 
worthiness of the revolution was not displayed until the later stages of the revolution, called the 
international buy-in, by Howard and Hussain (2011). This made the cause of the revolutions some-
what extraordinary since there was no real initiation by these prominent organisations to kick-start 
the protests, but the spread of the revolution had to work its way around the lack of communica-
tional resources. This was done through the use of social media, which was characterised by being 
relatively anonymous and with close to no social or economical preliminary requirements other than 
access to the internet (Howard et. al. 2011, p. 23). 
The Unity of the uprisings is arguably the most important factor of the Egyptian revolution, with 
actors using the social media to unite; such as Nawara Negm encouraging the Egyptians to bolster 
in the streets, singing songs and spreading the message of the revolution through social media, and 
Omar Afifi arranging the practicalities of clothing and coordination of safe actions by his followers. 
The fact that the unity of the movements was so prominent eventually lead to strengthening the 
worthiness of the cause, since the global societies eventually, through this uproar by the Egyptian 
people, had to notice and recognise the situation (Howard et. al. 2011 p. 13). 
The number of participants in the revolution went to a staggering amount, with people amassing in 
Tahrir Square to protest. Numbers were reaching several hundreds of thousands just in the square 
and adjacent streets (Swanson 2014, p. 1). 
Lastly, the commitment of the revolution lied in the ideological leaders, who persistently spearhead-
ed the revolution, sustaining the message through their continuous communication and updates on 
their respective media. The persistence of the few prominent actors meant that the majority of the 
Egyptian activists would keep being reminded and involved in the progress of the revolution 
(Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). 
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Howard and Hussain argue that the majority of the demonstrators in Egypt were “like-minded indi-
viduals, educated but underemployed (…), eager for change but committed neither to religion favor 
nor political ideology” (Howard and Hussain 2011, p. 38). The core members were young people in 
their twenties without mentionable experience in political action (ibid, p. 40). Although liberal and 
civil society voices were strong, Islamists, union members and opposition-party supporters were 
also part of the protests against the Mubarak regime (ibid, p. 39). 
It was characteristic that the participants in the demonstrations and gatherings came from all seg-
ments and from all groups in the Egyptian populations. As it is stated by Nathan Swanson (2014) 
“demonstrators in the square represented a wide spectrum of Egyptian society and repeatedly told 
journalists of the evaporation of regime-sanctioned animosities between liberals and Islamists, Mus-
lims and Coptic Christians, younger and older generations, among others” (Swanson 2014, p. 5). 
One of the many striking features of the huge demonstrations was that the sexual harassment which 
was rampant simply disappeared in Midan Tahrir and during demonstrations. It meant that many 
women from all segments and classes of the Egyptian society felt free and encouraged to participate 
(Swanson 2014, p. 5). It is interesting that exactly the issue of sexual harassment was used by the 
Mubarak regime to separate the different classes and moreover, the issue was used as an excuse to 
police the streets of Cairo. Concretely, it meant that working class young men were separated from 
middle-class women (Swanson 2014, p. 5). So the mere disappearance of sexual harassment was a 
defeat to regime tactics. 
It is also important to note that Coptic Christians and Muslims were together in their protests. The 
community was illustrated when the Christians protected praying Muslims (Swanson 2014, p. 5). It 
is also important to stress that it was not only young people who took part in the demonstrations, 
men and women of all ages participated (ibid, p. 5). According to Nathan Swanson, two elements 
are important when characterising the individuals participating in the 18 days in early 2011. First, 
people living apart, and as a deliberate result of government tactics kept apart, came together shar-
ing new experiences. Second, they could demonstrate and protest together in spite of different life 
situations and different goals. They stood together in the common purpose to remove the Mubarak 
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regime and thereby create conditions for another society which they most probably did not agree 
upon (Swanson 2014, p. 4-7). 
The protest meetings in Midan Tahrir in January and February 2011 are examples of non-
movements consisting of dissatisfied urban poor, women and not least young people in general, 
each with their own agenda. The youth just wanted to be young and in particular to curb the control 
of youthfulness. The women wanted to be able to work, have a career and make decisions about 
their own lives (Bayat, p. 17). 
The theory of connective action argues that one of the core characteristics of this type of action is it 
is self organising networks and therefore, they are leaderless in the classic sense, meaning that there 
was no “longstanding revolutionary figurehead, traditional opposition leader, or charismatic 
speechmaker to radicalise the public” (Howard & Hussain 2011, p. 37). Nevertheless, the WUNC 
principle recognises the role of some leading figures although such individuals were not considered 
leaders in the traditional sense. Rather, they were to some extent guides for the Egyptian people. 
The Arab spring in Egypt was characterised by these guides that were people living relatively aver-
age lives and furthered their messages through means available to a large part of the citizens (How-
ard et. al. 2011, pp. 5-6). 
One of these informational leaders was the local Google executive Wael Ghonim who was the crea-
tor of the Facebook group “We are All Khaled Said”. Ghonim became one of the most important 
actors in Egypt to use the digital- and social media (Howard et. al. 2011). After he was detained by 
the police on January 27, 2011 and released ten days later, Ghonim went to Tahrir Square and saw 
what he called an Egyptian people that had changed as if 12 years had passed (TED.com 2011). He 
stated that the people won the conflict not by achieving political results, but by proving that the 
people were able to make permanent change. In fact, he argued that the people made change by not 
knowing politics, and not playing by the rules of the oppressive regime (TED.com 2011). 
Mohamed ElBaradei was another individual who became known during the days of uprising in Jan-
uary and February 2011. He was the winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize and former chief on the 
United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (International Atomic Energy Agen-
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cy; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p. 1211). ElBaradei would proceed to be a symbol of the Egyptian 
people, with the Facebook page “ElBaradei for Presidency” (ElBaradei for Presidency of 
Egypt_2011) based on the people’s support for his actions. ElBaradei appealed to the young Egyp-
tian generation by meeting them on their own media – social media sites like twitter and Facebook 
– and posted his thoughts and plans for revolution on his own personal pages. Like other activists, 
he was of the opinion that change was inevitable in Egypt and the moment of revolution only de-
pended on when the Egyptian people were able to ‘throw off’ what he calls the culture of fear that 
the regime had created (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p. 1213). He and other activists used the social 
media not only to spread their ideologies. In the days leading up to the uprisings on January 25 he 
also provided specific information and instructions on the proceedings of the revolution. With so-
cial media as an instrument, the activists were able to make the necessary measurements to avoid 
loss of human lives in the operations made by the protesters; measurements such as to spray-paint 
the security forces’ vehicles and wash their faces with Coca-Cola to reduce the impact of tear gas 
(Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p. 1215). Even when the Mubarak administration were to shut down 
the internet on January 27, ElBaradei urged the public to focus their efforts on spreading the mes-
sage as wide as possible via social media, to make the whole world see the unfairness of the regime. 
The example of Mohamed ElBaradei clearly sheds light on how social media acted, not as the rea-
son, but as the tool to mobilise and connect the population of Egypt to take action. 
Yet another of the most hands-on of the prominent activists was Omar Afifi. Afifi was a former 
Egyptian police officer who began using social media to advise the people on matters of activism. A 
unique quality of Afifi’s activism, compared to many of the others, was that he emphasised a lot of 
his attention on making instructional YouTube-videos. Much like ElBaradei he used the social me-
dia to instruct Egyptians on specific details of the revolution, such as the exact day and location as 
well as what the protesters should wear (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p. 1213). 
Nawara Negm was an Egyptian blogger and activist who could be seen to share many of the charac-
teristics of the actual protesters. She was in her late thirties and made use of the technological inno-
vations that were available to her, and an important thing to note was that she, in opposition to the 
previously mentioned actors was a woman. The Egyptian women were a large part of the revolution 
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(Howard, et. al. 2011, pp. 5-6).  Negm’s engagement in the uprisings initially started during the 
Tunisian revolt where she posted a video message from an Egyptian actress to encourage the actors 
in Tunisia. Negm continuously urged Egyptians to support the Tunisian revolution by sending text 
messages to cell phone numbers that she had released for Tunisians (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p. 
1214). When the protests on January 25 neared, she told people to be active on social media and use 
it to create as much attention surrounding the events that would take place in Tahrir Square. She 
was a very symbolic character, urging people to protest in peaceful manners in songs and conversa-
tion and thereby create a coherent conversation that would spark the interests of the inside as well 
as the outside world (ibid, p. 1214). This message would then be taken to use in its literal sense by 
the Egyptian video journalist, Mohamed Abdel Fattah, who via Twitter sent a series of disturbing 
messages during the protests. He described his experience while having tear gas thrown around 
them, trapped inside a building and since being arrested and beaten (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p. 
1215). Such communication was very valuable for the uprising, since it provided essential infor-
mation about the areas in town that might need emergency help, but it also spread continuous in-
formation on the situation, which lead to the large amount of attention given to Egypt during the 18 
days (ibid, 1218). 
Summing up, there are a number of remarkable observations to be made about the Egyptian upris-
ing during the 18 days in 2011. First of all, the number of participants was remarkable. Second and 
probably more noteworthy, apparently it was not just the young generations that participated. All 
age groups were represented. It was not only the well-educated who participated also working-class 
members took part. Nevertheless, and most remarkable many women participated and for the first 
time, they could participate in a public gathering without being sexually harassed and sexually 
abused. Many sources describe the uprising as a ‘revolution’ in order to stress the uniqueness in the 
diversity among the participants.  Exactly the differences in goals and aims and, it can be added 
most probably also in political attitudes were also the weakness of the movement or of the revolu-
tion as it showed itself in the months and years following the 18 days in 2011. Irrespective of this 
potential weakness, it has to be stressed that the millions of individuals who most probably partici-
pated in the demonstrations in an on and of basis were able to act together with the clear aim to re-
move Hosni Mubarak from the presidency. 
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Conclusion 
The project started out by being puzzled by what happened during the unexpected Arab spring and 
not least by wondering what could explain the enormous demonstrations and the many gatherings 
of hundreds of thousands of Egyptians in and around Midan Tahrir in downtown Cairo. The project 
raised a rather simple question namely, why and how did the uprising in Midan Tahrir take the form 
they did? In order to answer the questions we proposed three sub-questions which were expected to 
help in answering the overall question. 
First, the project looked into the role played by the digital media in initiating the uprising and dur-
ing the 18 days. It was concluded the digital media played an absolutely crucial role as a means of 
communicating information about the where and how events and demonstrations were going to take 
place. The analysis also suggested an additional conclusion stating that the government's control of 
the public space and not least the government’s control with the flow of information was once and 
for all over. 
Second, the project concluded that there were a number of good reasons for why the uprisings start-
ed and received the strong popular backing it got and that these reasons had nothing to do with the 
widespread use of digital media. First and foremost, there seems to have been a significant frustra-
tion and discontent with the way the police and the security services acted in their contact with the 
population. In the media and therefore also most probably among people in the streets, the anger 
and frustration over police brutality, police abuse and here in particular sexual abuse by members of 
the police and security forces were widespread. Also, it seemed quite clear that many ordinary 
Egyptians were highly dissatisfied with the high level of corruption and general political miscon-
duct. The extensive rigging of elections basically meant that it was impossible for ordinary citizens 
to direct their frustrations and protests via the electoral system. The bottom line is that the ordinary 
citizen in Egypt was politically marginalised and totally without political influence. All of this 
makes it understandable that the dissatisfaction and the anger had to come out as they did during the 
18 days in Midan Tahrir.  
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Focussing on the economic circumstances also give reasons for the ordinary Egyptian citizen to 
protest and take to the streets. The high unemployment among the urban youth no doubt contributed 
to pushing the frustration and the anger. Probably, the rapid increase in poverty during the years 
preceding 2011 was one of the most convincing elements explaining the existence of frustration and 
anger which there was no peaceful or democratic outlet for. Midan Tahrir in early 2011 offered an 
obvious possibility to show dissatisfaction with the state of things. Here, it has to be stressed the 
increase in the number of people living in poverty took place at a time where the general economic 
indicators showed economic growth. 
Thirdly, the project scrutinised the protest movement in some detail and it concluded that it seemed 
very much to be a so-called non-movement because of the characteristics of its participants. First of 
all, there was no formal leader or leaders. Second, there was no formal program or clear aim even 
though one, the removal of Hosni Mubarak developed rather quickly. It was characteristic that the 
participants did not share many goals or agendas apart from one, the removal of the President. It 
appears to be the most significant feature of the movement that many participants more or less had 
their own personal agenda.  
In sum, the brief answer to the overall research question is that it seems highly probable that there 
was a high level of frustration and dissatisfaction with the general state of affairs in the beginning of 
2011. The widespread simmering discontent was ignited by the digital media, in particular by the 
Facebook messages from “We are all Khaled Said” calling for protest demonstrations against police 
brutality and sexual abuse by policemen. The combination of constant updating on the digital media 
and the profound dissatisfaction contributes to explaining why people for 18 days took to the 
streets.  
Maybe the most interesting conclusion is that Egypt apparently has entered into some kind of post-
modern development which is underlined by the fact that the uprisings were basically a non-
movement and thereby its actions carried the trademark of connective action and not that of tradi-
tional grass-root collective action. The latter element may contribute to explaining why the move-
ment or more correctly the non-movement of Midan Tahrir basically lost its momentum as soon as 
Hosni Mubarak was removed. When this single goal was achieved, nothing did bind the demonstra-
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tors together which stresses a crucial point that connective actions may achieve goals and successes, 
but connective action hardly changes a society in fundamental ways.  
The developments in the post-Mubarak era in Egypt seem to prove this point where Egypt is back to 
square one or maybe back to square minus-one. The same may be argued in relation to both Libya 
and Syria with the depressing observation that these two societies are now back to something that 
can best be described as square one minus-10 or worse.  
The theory of connective action has been helpful in interpreting the events of Midan Tahrir. Apply-
ing traditional theories on non-government movements or grass-root movements would lead to a 
conclusion arguing that we were confronted with an example of collective action which is supposed 
to be able to change the world. However, applying the theory of connective action offers another set 
of interpretations. Interpreting the uprising of Midan Tahrir as an expression of connective action 
not only suggests that Egypt has entered a kind of post-modern phase. The post-modern character of 
the non-movement of the days of uprisings in 2011 was to some extent surprising. It was surprising 
that so many hundred thousands took to the streets. 
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